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China is generally regarded as the new economic powerhouse in the global political 
economy. Some even talk of an emerging power, which may in time replace the US as the 
global economy’s hegemon. And yet, there is a dark underside to this ‘miracle’ in the form of 
workers’ long hours, low pay and lack of welfare benefits. Increasing levels of inequality 
have gone hand in hand with widespread working conditions characterised by super-
exploitation.  
Nevertheless, Chinese workers have not simply accepted these conditions of 
exploitation. They have started to fight back. The purpose of this volume is to analyse these 
various forms of resistance by Chinese workers and the way they are organised, be it through 
the official state trade union All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), be it through 
informal labour NGOs, or indeed both. Considering the large number of workers in Chinese 
production, what happens in China does not only affect Chinese workers, but equally workers 
elsewhere. Hence, the findings of this special issue on Chinese labour in the global economy 
are not only confined to China. They are of relevance for the global economy as a whole.  
In this Introduction, we will first analyse key developments in the global political 
economy to set the stage. Second, we will assess the location of Chinese production within 
this new international division of labour, before providing an overview of the contributions to 
this volume.  
 
Global restructuring: the new international division of labour.  
The post-World War Two years in industrialised countries were characterised by enormous 
growth rates and increasing wealth. National class compromises between capital and labour 
were the foundation of this post-war economic recovery. While labour accepted capital’s 
prerogative over the means of production and the way production is organised, capital in turn 
agreed on workers participating in growing wealth through a steady increase in wages and 
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improvement in working conditions. In tripartite relationships, the state supported this 
compromise through Keynesian, demand-led economic policies guaranteeing full 
employment in a system of mass employment and mass consumption. Additionally, the state 
supported the class compromise through an expanding welfare state establishing universal 
access to services such as health and education. Observers often speak of a golden capitalist 
age when commenting on the post-war period. Nevertheless, when the rate of profit started to 
decline, economic growth was no longer strong enough to ensure both, capitalist super-profits 
and rising wages for workers. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw increasing levels of 
industrial conflict in Western industrialised countries.  
 In response, capital renounced the national class compromises. While they 
technologically innovated production at the high-value added end in industrialised countries, 
in a spatial fix labour intensive parts of manufacturing such as the textile industry were 
transferred to cheap labour locations in the Global South (Silver, 2003, pp. 64-6). 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) became the dominant companies within the new, 
transnationalised social relations of production, and a transnational capitalist class emerged as 
the new key agent of global capital within what has been referred to as globalisation 
(Robinson 2004).  
 The increasing transnationalisation of production is reflected in the drastic increase in 
FDI especially since the mid-1980s, establishing lasting production links across borders. 
Outflows of FDI rose from US$ 88 billion in 1986 to US$ 1187 billion in 2000 as peak year 
(Bieler, 2006, p. 50). A period of recession caused a decline in FDI flows from 2001 to 2003, 
but four years of consecutive growth led to a new all-time high of FDI outflows of US$ 
1996.5 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 253). Overall, there were close to 80,000 
transnational corporations (TNCs) with roughly the same number of foreign affiliates in 2007 
(UNCTAD, 2008, p. 212). Unsurprisingly, FDI flows have again declined since the onset of 
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the global financial crisis in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 18), but even slightly lower levels 
contribute to the continuing build-up of FDI stocks over time, indicating the ever more 
important role played by TNCs. While outward FDI stocks had been US$ 2 253 944 million 
in 1990, they were US$ 7 298 188 million in 2000 and US$ 25 874 757 million in 2014 
(UNCTAD, 2015, p .A7).   
 The increasing transnationalisation of productionhas gone hand in hand with greater 
decentralisation and fragmentation of the production process itself through processes of 
outsourcing along the production chain. Thus, transnational production, under the direction of 
TNCs, is increasingly organised in global commodity chains (GCCs) (Robinson, 2008, p. 27). 
In this process, TNCs ‘began dividing the production process into ever finer segments, both 
vertical and horizontal, and locating the separate stages in two or more countries, creating 
cross-border production networks’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2013, p. 91). In these networks, TNCs 
no longer own the various production sites along the GCC, but rely on ‘independent contract 
manufacturers to procure the necessary parts and components and oversee their assembly into 
final products’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2013, p. 92). In other words, TNCs are still in charge, but 
their strategy has significantly changed. From owning cross-border production structures, 
they have moved to co-ordinating GCCs. As confirmed by the UN, ‘TNC-coordinated 
[GCCs] account for some 80 per cent of global trade. Patterns of value added trade in [GCCs] 
are shaped to a significant extent by the investment decisions of TNCs’ (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 
xxii). 
 ‘Developing Asia occupies the leading position in the new international division of 
labor. The region’s share in total world exports of manufacturers grew from 11.1 percent in 
1996-1997 to 33.8 percent in 2009/2010. Its share of total third world exports of 
manufactures increased from 68 percent to 76 percent over the same period’ (Hart-
Landsberg, 2015, p. 4). Within Asia, China mainly operates as the regional assembly 
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platform. ‘It is China’s unique position as the region’s production platform that enabled the 
country to increase its share of world exports of IT products from 3 percent in 1992 to 24 
percent in 2006, and its share of electrical goods from 4 percent to 21 percent over the same 
period’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2013, p. 34). In turn, these products are mainly destined for markets 
in North America and Europe integrating East Asia tightly with the global economy, but also 
making it dependent on continuing demand in the Global North. In sum, ‘since the region’s 
trade activity largely involves an intraregional trade of parts and components culminating in 
China-based exports aimed primarily at the United States and the European Union, the reality 
is that Asia has become ever more tightly integrated and dependent on exporting to developed 
capitalist markets, especially the United States’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2013, p. 36). The idea of 
South-South trade and economic co-operation as an alternative growth model for developing 
countries has not materialised. Rather, while China is the assembly platform of global capital, 
Latin America and Africa have mainly been reduced to exporters of primary commodities, 
with China having become their main customer. ‘While Latin American and sub-Saharan 
nations have long specialised in the export of primary commodities, developing Asia, 
especially China, has now replaced core capitalist countries as their main export market. 
China has surpassed the United States as the world’s largest consumer of major metals and 
agricultural commodities. In 2011, it consumed approximately 20 percent of all 
nonrenewable energy resources, 23 percent of major agricultural crops, and 40 percent of 
base metals’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2015, p. 6). 
Importantly, as David Coates remarked, the increasing organisation of production 
across borders and the related possibility for capital to move labour intensive production to 
cheap labour locations is not due to new technology, but the result of social developments. 
‘Capital is more geographically mobile than it was in the past because it now has more 
proletariats on which to land’ (Coates, 2000, p.255) and more proletariats to create. The 
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integration of China, India and the former Soviet Union during the 1980s and 1990s doubled 
the global workforce to almost three billion by 2000 (Freeman, 2010). In 2011, China's 
working-age population alone numbered over 1 billion (Economist, 2012). The increase in 
the global workforce has also fuelled the informalisation of production. This is especially the 
case in developing countries, which had never been in a position to establish a large industrial 
sector with permanent and secure employment. ‘According to the most recent estimates, non-
agricultural employment in the informal economy represents 82 per cent of total employment 
in South Asia, 66 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent in East and South-East Asia 
(excluding China), 51 per cent in Latin America and 10 per cent in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia’ (ILO, 2014, p. 6). Nevertheless, informalisation more and more also affects 
developed countries in the North, where employers are on the offensive and demand a 
flexibilisation of the labour market with the argument that it is necessary in order to retain 
competitiveness (Standing, 2011). ‘Although affecting workers in all core countries, the trend 
has probably gone furthest in Japan. There, part-time workers, who make on average 38 
percent less per hour than full-time workers, now account for approximately 40 percent of the 
workforce’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2015, p. 9). 
 The implications for workers around the world are clear. In times of transnational 
production, national labour movements are increasingly put into competition with each other. 
If workers in one country do not accept the demands by capital, production is moved to other 
locations where workers are more amenable. While trade unions were able to organise 
workers well at the national level, they have struggled to avoid this cross-border competition. 
Additionally, it has been very difficult to organise along these GCCs as well as within the 
informal economy (Bieler, Lindberg and Sauerborn, 2010).  
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Chinese production in the global political economy 
As a result of the particular location of Chinese labour in the global political economy as 
outlined above, Chinese production is characterised by two key aspects. First, it is 
predominantly based on cheap labour, necessary for assembling the various parts into final 
products for export to North American and European markets. ‘Chinese leaders have, like the 
leaders of most other countries, consciously pursued a low-wage growth strategy for some 
time’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2015, p. 14). Second, Chinese exports are dominated by foreign 
TNCs. By 2003, foreign TNCs and joint ventures ‘accounted for almost 80% of China’s 
exports of industrial machinery, 90% of computers, components, and peripherals; and 71% of 
electronics and telecommunications equipment’ (Panitch and Gindin, 2014, p. 152). This 
tendency has intensified further in recent years. ‘TNCs produce approximately 85 percent of 
China’s high technology exports. Moreover, the share of China’s high technology exports 
produced by wholly owned TNCs continues to grow, from 55 percent in 2002 to 68 percent 
in 2009, suggesting a tightening of foreign control’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2015, p. 5). 
Unsurprisingly, it is these foreign TNCs, which reap super-profits from exploiting Chinese 
workers. Foxconn, assembling products for Apple is a clear example in this respect. ‘Hon Hai 
[Foxconn] made $2.4 billion in profits in 2010, or $2,400 per employee, compared to 
$263,000 in profits reaped by Apple for each of its 63,000 employees (43,000 of whom are in 
the United States)’ (Smith, 2012). 
 As most export production is based on cheap labour, China must ensure a continuing 
supply of workers willing to work for low wages. This has been secured partly as a result of 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s, which resulted in the 
redundancy of some 60 million workers, and partly due to the growing group of migrant 
workers, which amounted to 269 million workers by 2013, coming from the countryside to 
the new production power houses in the coastal areas (Chan and Selden, 2014, pp. 600-1). 
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The power of workers decreased significantly as a result of increasing precarity and labour’s 
share of GDP ‘fell from approximately 53 percent of GDP in 1992 to below 40 percent in 
2006. Private consumption as a percent of GDP also declined, falling from approximately 47 
percent to 36 percent over the same period (Hart-Landsberg, 2013, p. 50; see also Qi, 2014). 
The agricultural sector has played a crucial role in ensuring the supply of cheap labour 
in that it provided a separate stream of income especially for the dependents of migrant 
workers left back at home. In turn, this facilitated the super-exploitation of migrant workers 
themselves. Agriculture is, thus, closely linked to industrial production in that ‘agriculture 
and the rural society provide the conditions for the reproduction of labour power. For rural 
households, agriculture in most cases is merely one of their income sources. Rural 
households are semi-proletarianised as they are participating in both household-organised 
agricultural production and wage employment’ (Qi, 2014). 
 Unsurprisingly, this development model has led to enormous levels of inequality. 
Capitalism in general is driven by dynamics of uneven and combined development and 
unevenness characterises the international situation between different countries, as well as the 
situation within countries. China is no exception in this respect (see the contribution by Jane 
Hardy in this volume). Internationally, despite Chinese development the gap between China 
and industrialised countries has remained large. ‘In 2010 (even after the aftermath of the 
crisis and recession) China’s GDP was $5.9 trillion—only 40 percent of the US’s $14.6 
trillion. Translated into GDP per head this gap is even starker: China’s $4,260 was only 9 
percent of the US’s $47,240’ (Hardy and Budd, 2012). As Neil Davidson concludes, 
‘although China develops more dramatically than any of the countries, like India, with which 
it is usually bracketed, it is unlikely on any remotely foreseeable scenario, to “catch up” with 
the West in any overall sense’ (Davidson, 2006, p. 226). Within China, inequality has 
increased too. ‘Whereas inequality in China in 1980 was comparable to that of social 
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democratic Germany (Gini coefficient = 0.25), by 2005 it was less equal than Russia (Gini 
coefficient = 0.45). The wealthiest 10 percent of the Chinese population earned seven times 
that of the poorest 10 percent in the 1980s but by 2005 that inequality had risen to a factor of 
18. The richest 10 percent of the population now accounts for 45 percent of the country’s 
wealth, the poorest 10 percent only 1.4 percent’ (Smith, 2008, p. 256). Hypermodern coastal 
regions are counterpoised to backward, inner rural areas. ‘According to one estimate, the 
“winners” of the economic reforms – the state administrators, managers, private 
entrepreneurs, professionals and technicians – amount to approximately 9 per cent of the 
entire population. The losers, on the other hand – the production workers, service workers, 
farmers, the unemployed and underemployed – amount to about 82 per cent of the 
population’ (Gray, 2010, p. 460).  
In response to the global financial crisis, China implemented a stimulus package of 
$586 billion in 2008 and 2009. Highly praised at the international level and regarded as proof 
of the narrative of China as a lender able to lead the global economy out of crisis, the way it 
was structured had dramatic implications at the national level. Because local governments 
were asked to provide matching funds for central government investment, the result was an 
‘increasing commodification of land as a means to generate income’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013, 
p. 457). In turn, this had social consequences. ‘Land sales and property development became 
important investment and speculative activities with consequences such as a property bubble, 
forced displacement from land, peasant riots, state terror, dispossession of the already 
vulnerable (e.g. migrant children) and increasing inequalities’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 
463). Moreover, this stimulus package has not increased private consumption as a percentage 
of GDP. In 2012, it was still at 35 per cent (Hart-Landsberg, 2015, p. 14) 
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And yet, importantly, workers are not only victims of capitalist exploitation. They 
have also got agency of resistance. As Chan and Selden indicate, labour disputes are on the 
rise, workers are fighting back:  
‘Official statistics show that in 1996, 48,121 labor disputes were accepted for 
arbitration, the total rising sharply to 120,191 in 1999, involving more than 470,000 
aggrieved laborers as numbers soared in the context of massive layoffs of state sector 
workers. The upward trend continued from 2000, reflecting widespread incidences of 
rights violations as the private sector expanded. Labor cases further skyrocketed to 
693,465 involving more than 1.2 million laborers nationwide in the economic crisis of 
2008. These were disputes over wage and insurance payments, illegal layoffs, and 
inadequate compensation payments’ (Chan and Selden, 2014, p. 607). 
 
Demanding higher income, better working conditions, respect for their dignity, and social 
protection, Chinese workers are no longer prepared to work in conditions of super-
exploitation. This volume is dedicated to a focus on workers’ resistance and an assessment of 
the possibilities of Chinese workers to improve their situation.  
 
Overview of special issue structure 
In her contribution, Jane Hardy analyses in detail how Chinese production is integrated into 
the global political economy along lines of uneven and combined development. While 
Chinese development is closely combined with global development, it is also extremely 
uneven between China and other countries as well as within China itself. Hardy further 
indicates how the stimulus package in 2008, with which the Chinese government attempted to 
avoid being dragged into the global recession, resulted in a huge crisis of overaccumulation. 
The official figure of $586 billion needs to be complemented by the additional loans taken up 
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by local governments across China, all in a desperate search for profitable investment 
opportunities. Ultimately, China’s response to the global financial crisis is based on a 
fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the government intends to boost domestic 
demand through higher wages to become less dependent on exports to North America and 
Europe; on the other, however, it needs to keep wages low to ensure increasing productivity 
and continuing competitiveness,on which large parts of Chinese exports are based. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the results of the stimulus package are highly mixed and private 
consumption as a percentage of GDP has not increased (see above).  
 Andreas Bieler and Chun-Yi Lee, in turn, start their comparative analysis of resistance 
in the cheap labour, low value-added electronics sector in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) area 
and resistance in the higher-value added IT sector in the Yangtse River Delta (YRD) with an 
analysis of the different locations of these two production sectors in the global economy. 
Because the electronics sector is mainly based on cheap labour, there are higher levels of 
industrial conflict over pay and working conditions. By contrast, the higher-value added IT 
sector depends on a more skilled and stable workforce. Hence, it has to provide better pay 
and working conditions. Unsurprisingly, these different locations in the global political 
economy shape the forms of struggle in the two sectors. In the electronics industry, informal 
labour NGOs generally assist workers individually and collectively in securing their rights, 
often in open confrontation with management, while more formal labour NGOs in the IT 
sector focus on organising interesting after-work activities for workers. Does this indicate 
that general upgrading to more high-value added activities could be a more general path 
towards improved working conditions for workers?  
 Boy Lüthje and Florian Butollo’s research casts doubts over this assumption. They 
investigate in more detail the electronics contract manufacturing (ECM) industry in China’s 
Pearl River Delta (PRD). They identify technological upgrading and diversification of 
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production, combined, however, with a continuation of super-exploitation of workers, based 
on extremely flexible mass production with a low-skilled workforce and a high turnover of 
personnel. There have been some continuing, modest wage increases due to a raising 
minimum wage, but base wages in general remain low and workers continue to depend on 
excessive overtime. In short, the linkage between industrial upgrading on the one hand, and 
an upgrading of work and labor relations on the other is weak. Social innovation in the 
workplace is still missing. Interestingly, the PRD continues to be a major site of ECM 
production with new factories further inland complementing rather than replacing factories in 
the PRD.  
How can we then understand the role of the Chinese state in industrial development 
and workers’ struggles for their rights? In their chapter on class struggle and the Chinese 
state, Chan and Hui argue that neither the notion that the role of the state has been 
undermined by globalisation, nor the concept of the state as an autonomous, independent 
actor are adequate, when assessing the Chinese state. Rather, the state needs to be understood 
as a field and condensation of class struggle. Hence, during the economic crisis global capital 
pushed the Chinese state towards reducing the protection of workers. In the wake of 
economic recovery, however, workers started to re-assert themselves in a wave of strikes 
such as the strike at Honda in 2010 and at Yue Yuen in 2014. To ensure the overall 
continuation of capitalist accumulation the state had to intervene in their support in relation to 
demands around collective bargaining and company contributions to social insurance 
systems. In short, class struggle rather than technological upgrading is the way towards 
improved working conditions.  
This conclusion is supported by Tim Pringle. In his contribution to this volume, he 
pursues a class against capital approach in his analysis of rising demands for collective 
bargaining by Chinese workers. Rather than drawing on the notions of ‘class-in-itself’ and 
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‘class-for-itself’, where especially the former is considered to be the result of workers’ 
location within production and, thus, delinked from struggle, the notion of class against 
capital emphasizes the centrality of class conflict overcoming artificial notions of fragmented 
working classes, often imposed by capital and the state from above to undermine labour 
solidarity. Interestingly, in his analysis of class struggles in the southern province of 
Guangdong, he also analyses in detail the struggles of the highly precarious and fragmented 
sanitation workers in Guangzhou in addition to the more well-known strikes in the Honda-
owned auto parts factory in Foshan, at the Yantian International Container Terminals and the 
Yue Yuen shoe manufacturer in Dongguan, examined by other contributions to this volume. 
Overall, he argues that labour has emerged as a class against capital in Guangdong changing 
the balance of class forces and pushing capital and state into forms of collective bargaining.  
The article by Chan and Selden focuses specifically on the situation of China’s 
migrant workforce. A new generation of migrant workers is emerging, they argue, which no 
longer intends to return to their homes in rural China, but wants to improve their lives in the 
cities, where they are working. Against the background of super-exploitation in companies 
such as Foxconn they adopt a variety of strategies to support their demands for better pay, 
better social benefits and more human working hours. The state increasingly attempts to 
intervene in disputes also through the official ACFTU to mediate between workers and 
employers, but workers are continuing to push independently to secure their rights from 
employers. Considering the crucial location in global commodity chains and the fact that 
there is a decrease in the number of young workers, these workers enjoy considerable 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers and the state. It is this bargaining power, which 
ultimately ensures that class struggle results in gains for workers.  
Xuebing Cao and Quan Meng analyse the strike by dockworkers at the Yantian 
International Container Terminals in 2013. They demonstrate how these workers were able to 
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organize themselves towards strike activity in the absence of an active official union, which 
resulted in a pay increase of 30 per cent. They could rely on a range of different sources of 
bargaining power, including most importantly, workplace bargaining power. The introduction 
of new technology in ports had implied that the work carried out had become ever more 
specialised. Hence, when these workers went on strike, their company was unable to replace 
them.  
In their contribution to this volume, Schmalz, Sommer and Xu analyse the underlying 
dynamics of the mass strike at the shoe factory Yue Yuen in Dongguan. Overall, three factors 
contributed to the strike. First, there has been increasing low wage competition by other 
regions in China and other countries putting downward pressure on shoe factories in southern 
China. Employers such as Yue Yuen attempted to cut costs by not paying social insurance 
contributions. Second, the Communist Party’s anti-corruption campaign is creating new 
spaces for workers to demand that employers comply with their legal obligations. Third, 
social insurance payments and their vital importance for older workers close to retirement 
have increasingly become an important issue for industrial conflict. Interestingly, unlike 
Chan and Selden in this volume, they point out that it is not necessarily always younger 
migrant workers, who take strike action. Middle-aged and older migrant workers too go on 
strike in order to defend their social protection such as pensions upon retirement. When it 
became apparent that their employer Yue Yuen had not paid the legally required social 
insurance payments, 40,000 workers took strike action concerned about their personal future.  
Against the background of two closely related hope projects – the global hope project 
of China as an object driving global growth as well as the Chinese hope project based on 
building national strength and modernity – Ngai-Ling Sum traces the emergence of a new 
subaltern class in China, the so-called Diaosi. This new group, on the one hand, actively 
embraces its loser identity and marginality in Chinese society. At the same time, she also 
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demonstrates that this development does not automatically imply that these Diaosi form a 
group of resistance to their exploitation. Many actions are also an expression of resignation. 
Capital, moreover, attempts to re-integrate the Diaosi into society by providing particular 
avenues of specific consumption for these people. It discovers the Diaosi as a potential 
market and thereby pacifies them. Finally, the state increasingly attempts to control their 
actions of resistance in the name of civility and social stability. In short, mounting resistance 
by Chinese workers against super-exploitation should not be taken for granted. It emerges in 
processes of class struggle, which also include moments of exploited workers’ co-optation 
into the hegemonic Chinese modernisation project.  
Globalisation has put different national labour movements in competition with each 
other. Hence, the level of exploitation of workers in China has direct consequences of 
exploitation levels of workers in other countries. Unsurprisingly, the global labour movement 
in its institutional expression of the International Trade Union Confederation and various 
Global Union Federations assess their possibilities of engaging with Chinese labour 
organisations and workers’ struggles and here in particular the ACFTU. With about 134 
million members, it appears to be too powerful an organisation to be disregarded. And yet, in 
their contribution to this volume, Rob Lambert and Eddie Webster caution against a rush 
towards official contact. As they point out, the ACFTU is actually part of the Chinese labour 
regime. Being closely aligned with, and subordinated to, the Chinese Communist Party, the 
ACFTU has little room for independent manoeuvre. Most importantly, the ACFTU has not 
accepted the international labour standards of the ILO including, for example, the right to free 
association. It is, therefore, not a ‘proper’ trade union independent from the Chinese state and 
can, as a result, not fulfil the function of organising workers’ resistance against exploitation. 
Rather than co-operating with the ACFTU, Lambert and Webster conclude, international 
labour organisations should support local workers and their struggles. Simultaneously, they 
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should intensify their pressure on the ACFTU to accept international labour standards. In the 
Conclusion to this volume, we will pick up on the issue of how to support best Chinese 
workers in their struggles for social justice.  
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